We examine the historical dynamics of government debt in Post-Unification Italy, from 1861 to 2009. Unit root tests for the debt-GDP ratio are unable to reject either the non-stationarity or the stationarity null hypothesis. Controlling debt dynamics for fiscal feedback policies of the Barro-Bohn style, however, the debt-GDP ratio is found to be mean-reverting. Mean-reversion in the debt-GDP ratio is due not only to a nominal growth dividend, but also to a positive response of primary surpluses to variations in outstanding debt. There is indeed significant evidence that, over the history of Italy, fiscal policy makers have reacted to the accumulation of debt, taking corrective measures to rule out potential long-term sustainability problems.
Introduction
The Italy's nominal public debt is the third largest in the world after the United States and Japan.
1 The Italy's public debt-GDP ratio is the eleventh largest in the world after Liberia, Japan, St. Kitts and Nevis, Guinea-Bissau, Lebanon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Jamaica, Seychelles, Grenada, and Antigua and Barbuda. Stationarity in the debt-GDP ratio, as emphasized by Bohn (2007) , appears to be the most relevant econometric condition to check whether fiscal policy is sustainable or may 1 See International Monetary Fund (2010) . 2 See Abbas, Belhocine, ElGanainy, and Horton (2010) .
generate potential solvency problems. 3 It is in fact empirically implausible, as emphasized by Chung, Davig and Leeper (2007) , that the debt-GDP ratio can grow without limit and, at the same time, be perceived by economic agents as sustainable. Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test examines the null hypothesis of stationarity against the alternative hypothesis of a unit root.
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The results over the whole period are puzzling. The ADF and PP tests are in favor of the non-stationarity null hypothesis for the debt-GDP ratio. 6 The KPSS is instead in favor of the stationarity null hypothesis. The conflicting results also hold over remarkable sub-periods. For example, in Table 1 3 Specifically, Bohn (2007) demonstrates that deriving sustainability tests from the government's intertemporal budget constraint imposes very weak econometric restrictions for testing the sustainability hypothesis. This is essentially because the intertemporal budget constraint is fully satisfied by government policies that let the debt-GDP ratio increase exponentially at a rate just marginally below the discount rate. The government's intertemporal budget constraint hence turns out to be satisfied even if the debt-GDP ratio is stationary after any finite number of differencing operations.
4 See Hamilton (1994) . 5 See Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin (1992) . 6 This finding continues to apply taking into account the possibility of structural breaks. The ClementeMontañés-Reyes unit root test (see Clemente, Montañés, and Reyes, 1998) using the "additive outlier" model (CLEMAO) with one endogenous structural break gives a t-value of −2.599, greater than the critical 5 percent value of −3.560, signaling the optimal breakpoint in 1917. The CLEMAO test with two endogenous structural breaks gives a t-value of −4.980, greater than the critical 5 percent value of −5.490, signaling the optimal breakpoints in 1948 and 1986. 7 ADF, PP and KPSS tests give however unambiguous results, in favor of the non-stationarity hypothesis, over the sample up to the 1991 global recession and the Maastricht Treaty (from 1861 to 1990), even excluding world war-time periods, and over the post-World War II sample (from 1948 to 2009). Galli and Padovano (2008) also find evidence of non-stationarity over the period from 1950 to 2002.
However, unit root tests arguably do not control for the behavior of governments' primary surpluses, as first shown by Bohn (1998) for the U.S. fiscal history. Then we incorporate the main determinants of primary-surplus policies, based on tax-smoothing theory (Barro, 1979 (Barro, , 1986 , into the government's budget constraint. This yields a dynamic equation in the debt-GDP ratio that can be estimated in order to detect stability or instability. We find significant evidence of mean-reversion in the debt-GDP ratio. The result is robust over several sub-periods. We show how mean-reversion in the debt-GDP ratio comes not only from a nominal growth dividend, but also from a positive response of primary surpluses to variations in outstanding debt. We indeed find significant evidence that, over the history of Italy, fiscal policy makers have reacted to the accumulation of debt, taking corrective actions to rule out potential sustainability problems.
The scheme of the paper is as follows. Section 2 investigates the relationship between debt and primary surpluses and derives the implications for the dynamics of Italy's government debt. Section 3 extends the analysis by incorporating inertia in the fiscal policy adjustment process in response to increases in debt. Section 4 summarizes the main conclusions.
Fiscal Feedback Policies and Debt Dynamics
In the Introduction we have pointed out that unit root tests for the Italy's debt-GDP ratio yield conflicting results. Neither the null hypothesis of a unit root, in the case of ADF and PP tests, nor the null hypothesis of stationarity, in the case of the KPSS test, can significantly be rejected. Unit root tests, however, arguably abstract from economic theory. Specifically, they do not control for the determinants of primary surpluses, as first shown by Bohn (1998) for the U.S. fiscal history.
To illustrate this point in a transparent way, consider first the government's budget identity, B t = (1 + i t ) B t−1 + G t − T t , describing how the nominal public debt B t at the end of period t depends on the nominal interest rate i t , the previous period's nominal public debt B t−1 , the non-interest public spending G t , and total revenues T t . Define the government's primary surplus as S t = T t − G t . Then divide both sides of the budget identity by the nominal GDP Y t to get the law of motion of the debt-GDP ratio,
where b t = B t /Y t , s t = S t /Y t , and r = (1 + i t ) / (1 + n t ) is the nominal interest rate deflated by the nominal growth rate, n t = (Y t − Y t−1 ) /Y t−1 . The assumption of a fixed after-growth interest rate r is common in the literature, and here is adopted only to make the argument as transparent as possible, without loss of generality. Suppose now that the primary surplus-GDP ratio is an increasing function of the outstanding debt-GDP ratio.
Specifically, consider a policy function of the form
where ρ > 0 captures the degree of reactiveness of the primary surplus to debt, Z t is a vector of additional determinants of the primary surplus, α is a vector of parameters, and ε t is a mean-zero error term. Substituting (2) into (1) results in the following equation describing the dynamics of the debt-GDP ratio:
where β = −α and v t = −ε t . Assume that Z t is stationary. Then the debt-GDP ratio is mean-reverting if r − ρ < 0. According to (3), standard unit root tests can easily fail to detect mean-reversion in the debt-GDP ratio for two reasons. First, if r − ρ is strictly below zero -but not much below zero -unit root tests can easily lead to accept the unit root null hypothesis. Second, unit root tests are misspecified since they omit Z t , that is, the non-debt determinants of the primary surplus.
Standard tax-smoothing theory (Barro, 1979 (Barro, , 1986 suggests that Z t should incorporate the level of temporary government spending and the level of temporary output.
When government spending is temporarily high, for example because of wars, and/or the level of output is temporarily low, for example because of recessions, sudden increases in tax rates necessary to maintain a balanced budget would bring about unnecessary economic distortions, affecting agents' choices for optimal time paths of labor, production, consumption, and investment. Therefore, it is optimal for the government to let the debt-GDP ratio increase in periods of temporarily high levels of spending and/or in periods of temporarily low levels of output.
This implies an empirical specification for the change in the debt-GDP ratio of the
whereg t is a measure of temporary government spending,ỹ t is a measure of temporary output, and (γ, β 0 , β 1 , β 2 ) are regression coefficients. Following Mendoza and Ostry (2008), we obtaing t andỹ t by detrending real government spending and real GDP, using the Hodrick-Prescott filter with the smoothing parameter equal to 100. The resulting "government spending gap"g t and the "output gap"ỹ t are shown in Figures 2-3. For Regression 1 in Table 2 , the γ coefficient on the lagged debt-GDP ratio b t−1 is significantly negative (−0.036, with robust t-statistic = −2.087), in favor of mean-reversion in the debt-GDP ratio. The β 1 coefficient on the temporary spendingg t is significantly positive (0.198, with robust t-statistic = 3.439), consistently with tax smoothing. The β 2 coefficient on the temporary outputỹ t insignificantly differs from zero (0.041, with robust t-statistic = 0.205).
Excluding world war-time periods, the mean-reversion result is more pronounced, and a positive effect of temporary declines in output on debt accumulation is detected, consistently with tax smoothing. From Regression 2 in Table 2 , in fact, the coefficient on the lagged debt-GDP ratio is significantly negative (−0.042, with robust t-statistic = −2.229).
The coefficient on the temporary spending is again significantly positive (0.208, with robust t-statistic = 3.314). The coefficient on the temporary output is now significantly negative (−0.529, with robust t-statistic = −2.504).
The general result of mean-reversion in the debt-GDP ratio holds over the sub-periods considered in Regressions 3-6 in Table 2 .
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Let us also use an alternative measure of temporary government spending and temporary output, based on the closed-form solution of Barro's (1986) tax-smoothing framework.
The two measures are referred as GV AR t for government spending and Y V AR t for output, and are given by GV AR t =
g t is real government spending, y t is real output, and g T t and y T t are corresponding trend values. A positive value of Y V AR t now denotes a period of temporary recession while a negative value denotes a period of temporary expansion. As forg t andỹ t , trends are obtained using the Hodrick-Prescott filter with the smoothing parameter equal to 100.
9
The resulting GV AR t and Y V AR t for Italy are shown in Figures 4-5 . The empirical specification for the change in the debt-GDP ratio is now Table 3 shows estimates of equation (5). Mean-reversion in the debt-GDP ratio continues to be detected for Regressions 1-6 in Table 3 To see why mean-reversion in the debt-GDP ratio is detected, recall the definition of the coefficient on b t−1 in equation (4), γ = r − ρ, where r is the nominal interest rate on government debt net of the growth rate of the nominal GDP, and ρ is the feedback response of the primary surplus-GDP ratio to increases in the debt-GDP ratio. Let first concentrate on the after-growth interest rate, r. Consistently with Bohn (2008) , let calculate the nominal interest rate on debt i t as the ratio of interest payments for period t over the average of the stock of nominal debt at the end of period t and at the end of period t−1. 10 For the whole sample, the average nominal interest rate on debt is 4.9 percent; the 9 Bohn (2008) measures temporary government spending for the U.S. as the difference between the actual and the estimated permanent military spending-GDP ratio. For the U.S. fiscal history, fluctuations are in fact dominated by military spending. For the Italy's fiscal history, however, fluctuations in government spending are not only dominated by military spending. Therefore, following Mendoza and Ostry (2008) , we continue to use a standard measure for g t − g T t . 10 Computing the nominal interest rate in this way enables us to take into account the fact that gov-average nominal GDP-growth rate is 10.2 percent, more than 3/4 due to inflation and less than 1/4 due to real GDP growth; 11 thus, r = (1 + 0.049) / (1 + 0.102) − 1 ≈ −0.048 < 0.
This implies that the "nominal growth dividend" has exceeded the interest cost on public debt, preventing per se the debt-GDP ratio from embarking on unstable paths.
Let now focus on the degree of reaction of primary surpluses to increases in debt, ρ. Table 4 shows estimates of the policy function
where (ρ, α 0 , α 1 , α 2 ) are regression coefficients. The ρ coefficient on the outstanding debt-GDP ratio is positive and highly significant in all Regressions. For example, for Regression 1 in Table 4 the ρ-value is 0.076 (with robust t-statistic = 3.032). This means that an increase in the debt-GDP ratio, say, by 10 percentage points has implied an increase in the primary surplus-GDP ratio by 0.76 percentage points on average. The variableg t enters negatively (−0.309, with robust t-statistic = −3.115) and the variableỹ t enters positively (0.447, with robust t-statistic = 1.671), consistently with tax smoothing. A significantly positive value of ρ is also detected substituting the measuresg t andỹ t with GV AR t and Y V AR t ; see Table 5 .
As a consequence, mean-reversion in the debt-GDP ratio is due not only to a nominal growth dividend, but also to a positive response of primary surpluses to variations in the outstanding debt. This positive response is sufficient for long-term sustainability of Italy's fiscal policy.
ernment debt is composed of a portfolio of securities with different interest rates. 11 Specifically, the average percentage increase in the GDP deflator is 7.7 percent while the average percentage increase in real GDP is 2.5 percent.
Incorporating Fiscal Policy Inertia
It is worth generalizing the above analysis to account for a potential inertia in the reaction of the primary surplus to debt accumulation. Specifically, consider a policy function of the form
where 0 < δ < 1 is a parameter capturing the gradual adjustment of the primary surplus to debt. Combining (7) with (1) now yields
where
The characteristic polynomial of J is P(λ) = λ 2 −TrJλ+DetJ. Stability requires that the two roots lie inside the unit circle. This applies if and only if the following conditions are satisfied:
From (9), TrJ = (1 + r) − (1 − δ) ρ + δ and DetJ = (1 + r) δ. It follows that conditions (10)- (12) are satisfied if and only if
ρ − r > 0.
(15) Table 6 shows estimates of the policy function
Using GV AR t and Y V AR t instead ofg t andỹ t yields estimates reported in Table 7 . The φ coefficient on the lagged debt-GDP ratio is significantly positive in Regressions 1-4 and 6-7
in Tables 6-7 . Over the full sample period 1861-2009, the φ-value is approximately equal to 0.015 (0.014 with robust t-statistic = 1.753 for Regression 1 in Table 6 , and 0.019 with robust t-statistic = 2.154 for Regression 1 in Table 7 ). With a δ-value approximately equal to 0.85 (0.860 with robust t-statistic = 18.198 for Regression 1 in Table 6 , and 0.825 with robust t-statistic = 16.393 for Regression 1 in Table 7) 
Conclusions
The paper has analyzed Italy's long-term budget data. Unit root tests for the debt-GDP ratio are unable to reject either the null hypothesis of stationarity or the null hypothesis of non-stationarity. Then we have controlled for fiscal feedback policies à la Barro-Bohn, based on tax-smoothing theory. We have found significant evidence of mean-reversion in the debt-GDP ratio. We have shown how mean-reversion reflects not only a nominal growth dividend, but also a positive reaction of primary surpluses to increases in debt.
The results thus favor the hypothesis of long-term sustainability in Italy's fiscal policy making.
Appendix: Description of the Data
The debt series b t is obtained by dividing the end-of-period central government nominal debt (Fratianni and Spinelli (2001) Notes: The graph shows the Italy's temporary government spending based on Barro's (1986) model, according to which GV AR t = ¡ g t − g -.05
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. Note: The graph shows the Italy's primary surplus-GDP ratio series s t described in the Appendix. 
